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APPROACHES TO BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: SOME 
NOTES ON TEACHING A SEMINAL CASE 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
During the past year, dozens of American law schools commemorated the 
fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education.1  The attention was 
appropriate because Brown is one of the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions.  
By all appearances, the fiftieth anniversary of Brown attracted much more 
attention than did, say, the 200th anniversary of Marbury v. Madison2 in 2003 
or the centennial of Lochner v. New York3 this year.  Brown’s unique 
significance resides in part in the fact that it changed America’s constitutional 
norm regarding race, our most embarrassing and vexing problem.  In 
effectively overturning the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson4 that separate but 
equal was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, Brown rejected 
apartheid as a constitutional principle to organize American society.  It went 
“where no court had ever gone before: to dismantle an entrenched social 
order.”5  As such it has become “a beloved legal and political icon.”6   
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful to my research 
assistants Anthony Gilbreth, Jackie Loerop, and Tim McFarlin and to Margaret McDermott, J.D. 
of the Saint Louis University School of Law Poos Library for their able assistance, and to Mary 
Dougherty for patiently retyping drafts of this Essay.  I am alone responsible for its shortcomings. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See, e.g., Brown@50 Symposium, 47 HOW. L.J. 1 (2003); Survey, 
Reflections on Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement in Virginia, 39 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Symposium, 50 Years of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 U. VA. L. 
REV. 1537 (2004); Symposium: Brown at Fifty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (2004); Symposium, 
Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: Have We Achieved Its Goals?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253 
(2004); Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty Years Later, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791 
(2004); Symposium, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years of Legal and Social 
Debate, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005). 
 2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  See, e.g., Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? or Both? A 
Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 313 (2003); Marbury at 200: A Bicentennial Celebration of Marbury v. Madison: Marbury 
as History, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205 (2003); Symposium: Marbury v. Madison, 200 Years of 
Judicial Review in America, 71 TENN. L. REV. 217 (2004). 
 3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 5. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 27 (2000). 
 6. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD 
HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL 
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It was not surprising that Brown so captivated American law schools last 
year during its golden anniversary.  It attracted attention at each of its earlier 
milestone anniversaries.7  Do we give it the same level of attention on a regular 
basis in our Constitutional Law courses?  It is difficult to know for sure 
without surveying Constitutional Law teachers—a task I have not undertaken.  
A review of Constitutional Law casebooks suggests we do not.  A few provide 
extensive materials regarding Brown, but most treat Brown no differently than 
most other cases.  A few notes typically introduce or follow the brief opinion, 
and then it’s on to the next case.  Of course, casebook pages are scarce, and the 
absence of extensive discussion of Brown in the casebooks does not mean that 
those teaching Constitutional Law do not spend days on it.  Perhaps most 
Constitutional Law teachers know so much about Brown that the casebooks 
need provide little background.  In any event, Brown is worth dwelling upon.  
It should be, perhaps with Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland,8 
the focal point of a Constitutional Law curriculum. 
Brown’s subject matter alone would justify giving it more time than most 
other cases.  It is, after all, the third in a trilogy of prominent cases dealing with 
race, after Dred Scott v. Sandford9 and Plessy v. Ferguson, and the only one of 
 
RIGHTS DECISION 3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter BALKIN]; see also Earl Maltz, Brown 
v. Board of Education and “Originalism,” in GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142 
(Robert P. George ed., 2000) (calling Brown a “constitutional icon”). 
 7. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Reflections: Twentieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of 
Education, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1974-1975); A Dedication to Mr. Justice Marshall on 
the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary: Brown v. Board of Education, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert 
L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward into the Future, 14 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615 (1979); Theodore M. Hesburgh, Brown After Twenty-Five Years, 
28 EMORY L.J. 933 (1979); Betsy Levin, Symposium: Educational Equality Thirty Years after 
Brown v. Board of Education, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 487 (1984); Nathaniel R. Jones, The 
Desegregation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 515 (1984); 
David Hall & George Henderson, Thirty Years after Brown: Looking Ahead, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 
227 (1985); Daniel Gordon, Happy Anniversary Brown v. Board of Education: In Need of a 
Remake After Forty Years?, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1993); Davison M. Douglas, 
The Promise of Brown Forty Years Later: Introduction, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337 (1995); J. 
Clay Smith, Jr. & Lisa C. Wilson, Brown on White College Campuses: Forty Years of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 733 (1995); Murray Dry, Brown v. Board of 
Education at Forty: Where Are We? Where Do We Go from Here?, 1 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. 
DIG. 8 (1995); Thomas B. McAffee, The Brown Symposium—An Introduction, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
1 (1995); Norman Williams, Jr., Using Discourse Ethics to Provide Equality in Education for 
African-American Children Forty Years after Brown v. Board of Education, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
99 (1995); Robert W. McGee, Brown v. Board of Education: More Than Forty Years of Asking 
the Wrong Question & the Case for Privatization of Education, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 141 
(1997); Cheryl Brown Henderson, The Legacy of Brown Forty Six Years Later, 40 WASHBURN L. 
J. 70 (2000); Drew S. Days, III, In Search of Educational E/Quality Forty-Six Years After Brown 
v. Board of Education, 54 SMU L. REV. 2089 (2001). 
 8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 9. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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the three that virtually all Americans now find palatable.  Brown clearly 
influenced the course of constitutional law during the subsequent half century.  
It heralded a new way of thinking about law.  Yet Brown’s pedagogical 
significance does not stem simply from the importance of the topic it addressed 
and the result it reached.  Brown also affords a rare opportunity to explore a 
whole range of central questions relating to constitutional law.  How should 
courts interpret the Constitution?  How much difference can judicial decisions 
make? 
The professor’s task is made easier by the vast literature Brown has 
spawned during the last half-century.  More than 2170 reported cases cite it.10  
Moreover, scholars have subjected it to book-length studies.11  Symposia 
celebrate each anniversary.12  Thus, teachers have a wealth of information to 
draw upon in teaching Brown. 
The purpose of this Essay is simply to suggest some of the angles teachers 
can usefully take in presenting Brown.  This Essay is not exhaustive, nor does 
it seek to resolve the issues it raises.  It draws heavily upon the rich corpus of 
work on Brown to summarize some issues that might contribute to a 
Constitutional Law course. 
I.  THE CASE(S) 
Brown, of course, involved a challenge to the racially segregated school 
systems that prevailed in many states in the early 1950s.13  In Brown, the Court 
considered and decided cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Delaware addressing state practices that separated white and black children in 
public schools.14  A case from the District of Columbia, Bolling v. Sharpe,15 
was argued with the state cases but was the subject of a separate opinion.  The 
District Court in Bolling had dismissed the case.16  In Gebhart v. Belton, a 
Delaware state court struck down laws requiring racially segregated schools 
 
 10. This number was generated from the Westlaw “Citing References” list for Brown. 
 11. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 6; ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE 
FOR EQUALITY (Vintage Books 2004) (1975); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO 
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 (1979). 
 12. See supra notes 1, 7 and accompanying text. 
 13. Some seventeen Southern and border states required that public schools be segregated in 
1954.  See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS 
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 646 n.35 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter 
DICKSON].  Four states (Kansas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming) gave local school boards 
discretion.  Id. 
 14. 347 U.S. 483, 486–88 & n.1 (1954). 
 15. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 16. The District Court’s dismissal was unpublished, but for the history of the case at this 
stage, see KLUGER, supra note 11, at 523–24. 
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and ordered Delaware’s schools to integrate immediately until equal schools 
could be created.17  In Brown v. Board of Education, the lower court had found 
that segregated schools harmed black children but refused to order 
desegregation on the grounds that the white and black schools were 
substantially equal.18  In Virginia and South Carolina, the lower courts found 
that the black schools were inferior and ordered the defendants to equalize the 
schools.19 
The states relied on the doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson,20 which had held 
that racially “separate but equal” railcars were consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause.21  The doctrine had provided the basis for many states to 
operate separate or dual school systems.22  They were rarely equal.  During the 
1930s and 1940s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”) had brought suits challenging segregation in institutions of 
higher education.  In a number of cases, the Supreme Court had required states 
to furnish equal opportunities for black students to study law or pursue other 
graduate studies.  In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the Court ordered 
Missouri to admit a black man to its law school.23  It could not meet its 
obligation to provide all qualified residents the same opportunity for training 
by sending Gaines to school in a neighboring state.24  Ten years later, in Sipuel 
v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Court ordered Oklahoma to 
educate Ms. Sipuel in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause.25  Finally, 
in 1950 the Court decided Sweatt v. Painter26 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents.27  In Sweatt, the Court found that Texas could not provide Herman 
Sweatt an equal legal education in a separate school for blacks.28  The quality 
of a legal education turned in part on intangible factors—reputation of faculty, 
alumni network, etc.29  Because Texas could not furnish Sweatt an equivalent 
education, it was required to admit him to the University of Texas Law 
 
 17. 91 A.2d 137, 140, 152 (Del. 1952); see Brown, 347 U.S. at 487–88 n.1. 
 18. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); see Brown, 347 U.S. at 487 n.1. 
 19. Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337, 340–41 (E.D. Va. 
1952), rev’d by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920, 
923 (E.D. S.C. 1952), rev’d by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown, 347 
U.S. at 486–87 n.1. 
 20. 163 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1896). 
 21. Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. 
 22. See DICKSON, supra note 13, at 646 n.35. 
 23. 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938). 
 24. Id. at 349–50. 
 25. 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948). 
 26. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 27. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
 28. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633–34. 
 29. Id. at 634. 
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School.30  In McLaurin, the Court held that Oklahoma could not subject 
George W. McLaurin to different treatment than white students received (i.e., 
segregated seating) in its graduate school.31  In these cases, the Court was able 
to rule in favor of the black student without holding Plessy unconstitutional.  In 
each case, separate schools were not or would not be equal.  Thus, the cases 
did not force the Court to overrule Plessy or abandon the separate but equal 
doctrine. 
Brown presented that question clearly, particularly because the lower court 
had found Kansas was providing substantially equal separate schools.32  As 
Professor Lucas A. Powe, Jr. has written, “although everyone knew that Negro 
schools had less of everything except leaky roofs than white schools, these 
cases were intentionally litigated on the assumption that everything except 
student assignments was equal.”33  The Court first heard arguments on the 
cases in 1952.34  The discussions at conference on December 13, 1952, 
revealed that the Court was split on the disposition of the cases.35  Although 
Justices Black, Douglas, Burton, and Minton were prepared to hold that 
segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause and/or the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause,36 Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and 
Clark seemed disposed to reaffirm Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine.37  
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson seemed troubled by the lack of conventional 
legal arguments to support striking down Plessy.38  Rather than render a 
divided ruling, the Court unanimously ordered that all cases be reargued 
regarding the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court’s 
equitable powers.39 
Fate intervened.  Chief Justice Vinson died on September 8, 1953.  
President Eisenhower had previously promised California Governor Earl 
Warren the first Supreme Court opening.40  Although Eisenhower may have 
intended to appoint Warren as an associate justice, Warren interpreted their 
 
 30. Id. at 635–36. 
 31. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640, 642. 
 32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
 33. POWE, supra note 5, at 29. 
 34. Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. 
 35. See DICKSON, supra note 13, at 644–53; see also POWE, supra note 5, at 23; KLUGER, 
supra note 11, at 617–18. 
 36. See DICKSON, supra note 13, at 648, 652–53. 
 37. Id. at 646–49, 653. 
 38. Id. at 651–52. 
 39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Et al., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).  See generally DICKSON, supra note 
13, at 644–53.  See POWE, supra note 5, at 23; KLUGER, supra note 11, at 618–19. 
 40. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 2 (1983). 
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agreement to extend to the Chief Justiceship, and ultimately Eisenhower 
appointed him.41 
The cases were reargued on December 7–9, 1953,42 and initially discussed 
in conference on December 12, 1953.43  At this time Warren was acting under 
a recess appointment.44 
On May 17, 1954, the Court issued unanimous decisions in Brown and in 
Bolling holding that separate but equal had no place in public education.45  
Both opinions were brief.  Brown contained thirteen paragraphs spread over 
thirteen pages of Volume 347 of the U.S. Reports.46  In fact, the critical part of 
the opinion was shorter than even this description suggests.  The first three 
pages listed headnotes and counsel.47  The next three outlined facts and 
procedural matters.48  Two pages explained the inconclusive nature of the 
Court’s effort to determine whether the framers intended the Equal Protection 
Clause to preclude school segregation.49  Almost two more pages introduced 
the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson and sought to 
distinguish it as applying to transportation, not education.50  The last page was 
a briefing order.51 
The Court devoted only about two and one-half pages to outlining the 
rationale of the opinion.  The Court could not “turn the clock back to 1868 
when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted” or to 1896 when it decided 
Plessy.52  Instead, it “must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”53 
The Court noted the paramount role of public education “to our democratic 
society.”54  It was a prerequisite to discharging basic civic responsibilities.55  It 
inculcated American values.56  “In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.”57  The states must provide education to all on equal terms.58 
 
 41. Id. at 5–7. 
 42. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954). 
 43. DICKSON, supra note 13, at 654. 
 44. Id. at 653. 
 45. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 46. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483–96. 
 47. Id. at 483–85. 
 48. Id. at 486–88. 
 49. Id. at 489–90. 
 50. Id. at 490–92. 
 51. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96. 
 52. Id. at 492. 
 53. Id. at 492–93. 
 54. Id. at 493. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 57. Id. at 493. 
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Separate but equal schools harmed black children.  “To separate them from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”59  “Modern authority” 
supported this finding.60  That authority included psychological studies arguing 
that school segregation harmed African-American children.61  Thus, “in the 
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ ha[d] no place.”62  
The Court concluded its opinion by directing the parties to present further 
argument regarding questions as to remedy that had previously been 
proposed.63 
Bolling required less than four pages.64  Because Congress had jurisdiction 
over the public schools in the District of Columbia,65 the Fifth Amendment 
applied.66  Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not contain an Equal 
Protection Clause.  Yet equal protection and due process both came from the 
American concept of “fairness.”67  Racial classifications “must be scrutinized 
with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”68  Liberty, as protected by the Due Process Clause, 
could not be restricted for arbitrary reasons but only for some “proper 
governmental objective.”69  School segregation was not such an objective.70  
Because the Equal Protection Clause precluded the states from operating 
segregated schools, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would 
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”71 
Finally, on May 31, 1955, some fifty-four weeks after the Court issued the 
aforementioned opinions, the Court delivered its opinion relating to remedial 
issues.72  The Court recognized that implementation of the constitutional 
principles it had stated might require different responses in different 
localities.73  It remanded the cases to the courts that had originally heard 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 494. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. 
 62. Id. at 495. 
 63. Id. at 495–96 & n. 13. 
 64. 347 U.S. 497, 497–500 (1954). 
 65. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 66. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 499. 
 69. Id. at 499–500. 
 70. Id. at 500. 
 71. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
 72. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Brown II”). 
 73. Id. at 298, 299. 
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them.74  While recognizing “the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission 
to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,” the 
Court also noted the “public interest in the elimination of [a variety of] 
obstacles in a systematic and effective manner.”75  School boards must make a 
good-faith beginning, in other words “a prompt and reasonable start toward 
full compliance.”76  District courts should act “with all deliberate speed” to 
admit plaintiffs to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.77 
II.  WHAT DID BROWN DECIDE 
At the most basic level, Brown and Bolling decided that the Constitution 
prohibited federal or state government from operating racially segregated 
public schools.  Although the decisions made this result clear, they left broader 
implications murky.  The Court wrote the decision narrowly, specifically 
limiting it to education: “We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”78 
The cases dealt with public elementary and secondary schools, and the 
Court referred to children.79  The Court did not overrule Plessy generally.  
Indeed, its rejection of certain specific language in Plessy80 implied that it 
otherwise stood. 
In important respects, the decision proved broader than its language 
suggested.  Although Brown spoke only of public education, it clearly had a 
wider impact than its language hinted.  In short order the Court made clear that 
pursuant to Brown, Plessy and the Jim Crow laws it sustained were invalid.  
Ten months after the Court’s decision, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit unanimously applied Brown to bar Baltimore from operating 
racially segregated public beaches and bathhouses.81  It was “obvious,” the 
court said, that the police power did not authorize states to segregate facilities 
to “preserve the public peace.”82  In a series of cases the Court outlawed 
“separate but equal” golf courses,83 public parks,84 libraries,85 buses,86 airport 
 
 74. Id. at 301. 
 75. Id. at 300. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
 78. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 79. 347 U.S. at 493. 
 80. Id. at 494–95. 
 81. Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386(4th Cir. 1955), aff’d, 
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (holding segregation at public beaches unconstitutional). 
 82. Id. at 387. 
 83. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). 
 84. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam), 
aff’g, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958). 
 85. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
 86. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
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restaurants,87 municipal auditoriums,88 and courtrooms.89  As Robert L. Carter 
wrote, “Brown thus extended to its natural consequences could mean that the 
fetters binding the Negro were at last being struck, and that he would 
henceforth be able to stretch himself to his full potential.”90  One area took 
longer; the Court postponed ruling on antimiscegenation issues until 1967,91 
having been persuaded to duck a challenge to Virginia’s law in 195592 
apparently to avoid further inflaming Southern passions. 
In other respects, Brown probably did not extend as far as its broad 
language suggested.  The Court stated that where a State operated a public 
school system it created “a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”93  Yet if the Court meant in 1954 that all public schools in a State had 
to be of equal quality, it never acted upon that vision.  Indeed, two decades 
later, in San Antonio v. Rodriguez94 the Court held that Equal Protection did 
not mandate funding equity, a decision which Justice Thurgood Marshall 
viewed as a departure from Brown.95 
Ultimately, the issue before the Court in Brown and Bolling was whether 
segregated public schools, even if equal in tangible factors, deprived minority 
children of equal educational opportunities.  The Court held that they did.  Its 
conclusion rested upon a rationale the Court stated in a single sentence.  “To 
separate them [African-American children] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”96 
If the result—segregated public schools were illegal—was clear, the 
rationale was subject to debate.  Did Brown rest on the principle that 
government could not use race as a basis for classifying?  Alternatively, did the 
opinion rest on a notion that government could not subordinate blacks to 
whites? 
Both ideas had impressive pedigrees.  Indeed, Justice Harlan had deployed 
the ideas side by side in his famous dissent in Plessy.  There he wrote: 
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no 
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our 
 
 87. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). 
 88. Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964). 
 89. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). 
 90. Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 237 (1968), in 
THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 47 (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds., 1968). 
 91. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 92. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
 93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 94. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 95. Id. at 71–72. 
 96. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
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Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.97 
Justice Harlan’s “no caste” idea suggested that the antisubjugation rationale 
animated the clause.  His color-blind constitution metaphor pointed to an 
anticlassification norm.  Moreover, in arguing Brown before the Court, the 
NAACP had advanced both arguments.  It argued, first, that Kansas lacked 
power “to impose racial restrictions and distinctions.”98  Moreover, it claimed 
that segregation harmed black children by stamping them as inferior.99 
The Court did not need to choose between the anticlassification and 
anticaste principles to decide Brown.  In that case both roads led to the same 
destination.  Separate but equal classified based on race and reflected a belief 
in the inferiority of blacks.  Yet the issue had more than esoteric interest.  It 
affected the resolution of questions which later arose and dominated the 
jurisprudence of much of the last third of the twentieth century.  If Brown 
rested on the anticlassification principle, other programs would be affected.  
Could a school district use race to assign students in order to achieve 
integration?  Was racial balancing an appropriate objective?  Would 
affirmative action and other race conscious programs be inconsistent with a 
principle that Thou Shalt Not Classify By Race?  Alternatively, the 
antisubjugation principle would allow government greater latitude to 
distinguish between races to redress past injustices or achieve other 
instrumental goals. 
Both positions have had proponents on the Court.  At the 1952 conference, 
Justice William Douglas argued that “[n]o classification on the basis of race 
can be made” under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment.100  More recently, Justices Scalia101 and Thomas102 have 
embraced the anticlassification principle as the proper idea behind the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Others, such as Justices Thurgood Marshall103 and Harry 
Blackmun104 endorsed the anticaste rationale. 
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It is difficult to attribute the anticlassification idea to Brown.  Brown did 
not state that the Constitution precluded racial classification.105  Its failure to 
articulate this principle is particularly significant because plaintiffs pushed this 
argument in their brief.  On the contrary, its key language addressed the effects 
of segregation on black children.106  The Court wrote: “To separate them from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”107 
The implication was, of course, that segregation harmed black children 
because it represented the majority’s message that they must be kept separate 
because they were inferior.  Brown rejected contrary language in Plessy, which 
asserted that any inference that segregation “stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority” was not “by reason of anything found in [the Louisiana 
law at issue in Plessy], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it.”108 
Chief Justice Warren saw the subjugation issue as central to Brown.  He 
voiced this premise early in his opening remarks at the December 12, 1953, 
conference.  He told his new Brethren: 
The more I read and hear and think, the more I come to conclude that the basis 
of the principle of segregation and separate but equal rests upon the basic 
premise that the Negro race is inferior.  That is the only way to sustain 
Plessy—I don’t see how it can be sustained on any other theory.  If we are to 
sustain segregation, we must do it on that basis.  If oral argument proved 
anything, the arguments of Negro counsel proved that they are not inferior.109 
Chief Justice Warren made this point explicit in his opinion.  The “question 
presented,” wrote the Chief Justice, was whether school segregation deprived 
“the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities[.]”110  
The Court stated the problem in language which suggested antisubjugation, not 
anticlassification, was its concern. 
Moreover, the Court cited a finding in the Kansas case that “well stated” 
the “effect of this separation” on the “educational opportunities” of black 
children. 
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental 
effect upon the colored children.  The impact is greater when it has the 
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sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted 
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.  A sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of a child to learn.  Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, 
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro 
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a 
racial[ly] integrated school system.”111 
Indeed, in a recent article Professor Reva B. Siegel has argued that the 
Court did not adopt the anticlassification idea for more than a decade after 
Brown.112  Instead, it favored the antisubjugation norm, which pivoted on the 
notion that segregation harmed blacks.113  Southerners contested this idea and 
argued that integration, not segregation, harmed both races.114  Courts 
embraced the anticlassification rationale as a way to insulate integration from 
attack on the grounds that it harmed rather than helped.115  Even as courts 
adopted the anticlassification norm “they understood that the purpose of equal 
protection doctrine was to prevent the state from inflicting certain forms of 
status harm on minorities.”116 
Yet the issue is a bit murkier.  In Bolling the Court included some language 
which suggested that the anticlassification principle had a role: “Classifications 
based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are 
contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”117  The Court 
may well have had an extraordinarily generous view of “our traditions” 
because any reading of history would suggest that racial classifications had 
been intrinsic to certain of our less noble traditions.  But perhaps the Court 
meant simply that those odious practices violated our aspirations and ideals 
and in this sense violated the traditions we sought to establish.  It went on to 
quote language that the Constitution “forbids, so far as civil and political rights 
are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, 
against any citizen because of his race.”118 
How to reconcile that language with the different approach of Brown?  It 
seems unlikely the Court meant to apply a different test to federal and state 
governments because Bolling quoted language that subjected them to a 
common norm.  Could the difference have been that the language on which the 
 
 111. Id. at 494. 
 112. See generally Siegel, supra note 105. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 1498–99. 
 115. See id. at 1499. 
 116. Id. at 1514; see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1. 33 (1959) (noting that Brown turned on antisubjugation principle); 
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 421 
(1960) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause forbids states from “significantly 
disadvantag[ing]” blacks). 
 117. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 118. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] APPROACHES TO BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 789 
Court relied in Bolling came from cases interpreting a Due Process Clause and 
accordingly the Court felt uncomfortable applying the anticlassification 
principle in Equal Protection cases?  Different law clerks worked on the two 
opinions.119  Yet the Court considered the opinions so thoroughly it seems 
inconceivable that the fortuity of which clerk worked on which opinion 
accounted for the difference.  Ultimately, two points are worth making.  First, 
Brown was the lead opinion, the one which received the most attention and to 
which most significance attached.  Second, Bolling raised a modest version of 
the anticlassification rationale.  Bolling did not push anticlassification as far as 
modern day proponents such as Justices Scalia and Thomas sometimes do.  
Bolling did not preclude government from classifying based on race.  It said 
simply that such classifications “must be scrutinized with particular care” and 
that they were “constitutionally suspect.”120  That requirement implied that 
racial classifications were not per se unlawful.  If they were, no careful 
scrutiny would be needed.  Identifying the classification would suffice to strike 
it down.  Indeed, in the lead case the Court cited for the point, Korematsu v. 
United States, the Court had specifically noted that all racial classifications 
were not necessarily unconstitutional.121  Indeed, Korematsu had not 
scrutinized the racial classification with much care and upheld it as serving a 
public necessity!122  To the extent that Bolling supports an anticlassification 
principle, it is a qualified one. 
Brown was also ambiguous as to what the Constitution required.  Did 
Brown simply outlaw segregation or did it require integration?  The Briggs 
court subsequently concluded that Brown did not require that “the states must 
mix persons of different races in the schools.”123  Instead, it simply held that 
states could not “deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any 
school that it maintains.”124  Government could not segregate, but it need not 
integrate.  The difference was significant.  Did Southern states need to simply 
show they were not still separating the races, or did they need to present plans 
creating racially mixed school populations?  Although the Court ultimately 
recognized a difference between de jure and de facto segregation, Del Dickson 
reports that private Court documents suggest that in 1973 five justices thought 
the distinction should be discarded.125 
In retrospect, Brown stands for at least four basic constitutional ideals.  
First, Brown celebrates education as a prerequisite to the American Dream.126  
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Brown recognized “the importance of education to our democratic society.”127  
Education is “the very foundation of good citizenship.”128  It exposes a child to 
cultural values, allows her to adjust to her environment, and prepares her for 
professional training.129  A child cannot be expected to succeed if denied an 
education.130  Accordingly, education was a “right” that had to be made 
“available to all on equal terms.”131  Separate education was inherently unequal 
because it meant that the American Dream could be reality for white, but not 
black, children. 
Second, Brown stands for the communitarian idea implicit in the 
Constitution that we are one people.  The preamble of the Constitution begins 
with the words “We, the people.”  Those words had not included blacks during 
the long period when slavery was legal and Jim Crow constitutional.  Brown 
changed that.  Plessy stood for the notion that America consisted of two 
communities, white and black, who lived in separate neighborhoods, attended 
different schools, rode in different railcars, and used different restaurants, 
restrooms, and doors.  Brown challenged that model.  In implicitly rejecting 
Plessy, Brown signifies that there is one America in which whites and blacks 
are to be equal members. 
Third, as suggested above, Brown endorses the antisubordination ideal as 
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.  Racial classification is offensive 
because it casts blacks as lesser members of the community.  Brown signifies 
that blacks are equal members of America.  Finally, Brown represents a 
constitutional principle regarding how majorities should treat minorities.  After 
all, Brown notes the psychological harm segregation caused black children by 
signifying their legal inferiority.  Brown stands for the ideal that majorities 
must structure society in a way that does not allow minorities to reasonably 
conclude that they are lesser members of the political community.  Brown 
implicitly embraces the insight in the Carolene Products footnote four that 
courts should carefully scrutinize classifications adverse to discrete and insular 
minorities.132 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
A. Brown 
Brown affords an opportunity to engage students on the merits of different 
styles of constitutional argument.  Lawyers and judges typically employ 
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several modes of constitutional analysis in arguing about constitutional 
interpretation.  Although most would agree on a descriptive statement of the 
six or seven types of argument typically used,133 there is less consensus 
regarding the prescriptive or normative claims regarding what sorts of 
arguments should receive emphasis.  Whereas some emphasize textual 
argument or intent of the framers as preferred methods of analysis, others 
prefer doctrinal, structural, or moral or consequential argument. 
Brown provides one lens through which to examine the relative merits of 
these claims.  As Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell put it, “[s]uch is 
the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not produce the 
conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is seriously 
discredited.”134 
The most familiar and comfortable modes of constitutional analysis would 
not, in 1954, have produced the ruling Brown reached.  The constitutional text 
did not speak directly to school segregation.  No constitutional language said 
“no State shall provide segregated education for white and black children” or 
words to that effect.  The Constitution did prohibit a state from denying any 
person equal protection of the laws, but, as a matter of abstract logic at least, it 
was not clear that equal protection mandated integrated facilities.  After all, no 
one claims a constitutional violation when the state provides separate 
restrooms for men and women.  Why could not separate but equal schools 
protect all equally?  This consideration poses challenges for textualists.  Did 
textual argument support the position of the school boards in favor of separate 
but equal?  Was textual argument inconclusive?  Or must the textual 
requirement of equal protection be considered in some historical context rather 
than as a matter of abstract logic? 
Textual argument was even less helpful in Bolling v. Sharpe, which 
considered whether Congress could maintain racially separate schools in the 
District of Columbia.  Clearly the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not limit federal action and other constitutional clauses spoke 
to the issue remotely at best. 
Nor was originalist argument very helpful.  The Supreme Court had 
directed the parties to brief whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
intended to ban racially segregated schools.135  That order, on its face, 
suggested the Court gave credence to original intent.  Presumably, if the 
evidence had suggested that the framers of the Amendment intended to bar 
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school segregation the Court would have so argued.  Such a finding would 
have eased the decision for those justices who were morally opposed to 
segregation but were groping for a conventional legal argument to strike it 
down.  Some justices apparently expected the evidence to so point.  The parties 
submitted mountainous volumes of materials that drew upon some of the 
foremost historians and legal scholars.136  Yet the Court concluded that 
although the exhaustive discussion regarding original intent “cast some light” 
it was insufficient to resolve the question because “[a]t best, [the sources] are 
inconclusive.”137 
The Court’s analysis highlighted two reasons why efforts to rely on 
original intent are often unsuccessful.  First, the record was inconclusive 
because it failed to reveal a complete or consistent picture of the preferences of 
those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.138  Second, the 
record was inadequate because the problem the Court faced in 1954—was 
separate but equal constitutional in public education?—was not a pressing 
issue in the late 1860s.  Public education was in its infancy and education of 
blacks “was almost nonexistent.”139 
In fact, the evidence regarding original intent may have been worse than 
the Court suggested.  “The original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment plainly permitted school segregation[,]” wrote Michael Klarman 
in his recent book on race in America.140  Most scholars who have studied this 
question share Professor Klarman’s conclusion.141  Mark Tushnet, for instance, 
points out that the Congress which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment 
supported segregated schools in the District of Columbia.142  Proponents of the 
Amendment routinely denied that it would lead to integrated schools.143  Five 
northern states excluded black children from public schools altogether; eight 
states allowed segregated schools.144  Michael McConnell, now a judge on the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, reached a different conclusion.  An 
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originalist, Judge McConnell argues that in a series of votes after the states 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, a majority of Congress voted in favor of 
school desegregation.145  Judge McConnell suggests that the congressional 
support suggests that Brown is consistent with what the drafters intended.146  
Professor Klarman has disputed this claim.  He argues that most Americans 
would not have agreed to a constitutional amendment in 1868 banning 
segregated schools.147  He criticizes Judge McConnell’s emphasis on the 
actions of drafters rather than ratifiers.148  And he argues that debates from 
1872 to 1874 do not reflect intent several years earlier.149 
Precedent, too, would not take the Court to the result it ultimately reached.  
Plessy v. Ferguson had promulgated the doctrine of separate but equal fifty-
eight years earlier.150  In Brown, the Court rather feebly distinguished it as 
dealing with transportation rather than education.151  Yet Plessy had, as the 
Court acknowledged, relied on an education case,152 had compared 
transportation to education,153 and the Court had applied it in a half dozen 
cases dealing with public education.154  Cases had demonstrated that equality 
rarely followed from separation and had eroded somewhat the underpinnings 
of a system which subordinated blacks.  Yet Plessy remained part of the law of 
the land in 1954. 
Thus, conventional legal arguments could not readily produce the result the 
Court needed to reach.  The Court could not attribute its result either to the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or to the logic of the decisions of earlier 
courts.155 
The Court rejected the premise that history set the Constitution’s meaning.  
Instead, the Court embraced a notion of a living Constitution. “[W]e cannot 
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turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”156  Implicitly, the Court did not 
think the Constitution’s meaning was fixed by the framers’ intent.  Rather, it 
must adapt to changing circumstances.  Accordingly, the Court relied on less 
conventional constitutional arguments.  It made a sociological argument based 
on empirical data measuring psychological harm on black children from 
segregated schools.  It cited, in its controversial footnote 11, the doll studies of 
Dr. Kenneth Clark and other “modern authority.”157  Yet this data could only 
be persuasive if it connected to a norm that held such psychological harm a 
constitutional violation.  As Professor Edmond Cahn argued, the data 
confirmed what the justices already knew.158  Segregation sent a message 
blacks were inferior, lesser members of the community.  And that was wrong.  
Ultimately, Brown was essentially a moral decision.159  The Court concluded 
that school segregation was morally wrong because it imposed psychological 
harm on black children. 
But if Brown was a moral decision does that suggest that it rested simply 
on the subjective ethics of the nine justices who decided it?  That the decision 
had no objective basis?  And if so, what elevated Brown above Dred Scott v. 
Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson?  Was the difference simply that Brown 
strikes a contemporary audience as morally just whereas we regard the other 
decisions as morally hideous? 
The moral or political nature of the decision left Brown open to the charge 
that the judiciary had usurped the role of the legislature, federal and state, and 
had engaged in judicial legislation.  The argument proceeded from two 
different premises.  To some extent the charge rests on a preference for modes 
of constitutional argument which the Court avoided.  Proponents of textualism 
and originalism argue that those modes of argument constrain judicial choice.  
By so doing, they inhibit judicial legislation and leave more issues to political 
decision.  Even precedent, a mode of argument to which committed textualists 
and originalists generally assign less weight, forces judges to connect their 
decisions to the work of prior jurists.  Such claims are controversial.  Should 
the Court have adhered to the text, the framers’ specific intent and precedent 
and have upheld separate but equal? 
A second line of attack, however, suggested that Congress had authorized 
Congress, not the Court, to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 5 of 
the Amendment signaled an intent that Congress take the lead in vindicating 
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the Amendment’s purpose.  Of course, as Charles L. Black, Jr. pointed out, 
there was “no contradiction, either logical or practical, in applying both 
judicial and legislative power to the same end.”160  Moreover, Professor Black 
pointed out, the argument was raised a little late, after many cases, including 
Plessy, implicitly held the opposite.161  The objection that would effectively 
convert the Equal Protection Clause into a political question would, of course, 
radically transform constitutional law.  If it is the province of the Court “to say 
what the law is,”162 as Marbury proclaimed, removing Equal Protection from 
its jurisdiction would change things quite a bit.  In any event, the present 
Court, which frequently asserts Marbury and has confined Congress’s power 
under Section 5,163 although apparently not regarding race,164 seems to be 
going in a different direction.  Finally, would not reliance on Section 5 have 
clashed with the philosophy expressed in Carolene Product’s footnote 4?  The 
national legislature, dominated as it was by Southerners who could veto 
meaningful civil rights legislation, would preclude action regarding school 
desegregation.  Blacks, as the paradigmatic “discrete and insular minority” 
would receive no relief from the political process.  The Court, in stepping in, 
acted in concert with that approach. 
The appeal of some forms of interpretation reside in their claimed potential 
to provide objective sources for constitutional outcomes.  Thus, some argue 
that textualism and originalism can constrain the discretion of unelected judges 
who otherwise might write their own moral or policy preferences into 
constitutional law.  Regardless of the merits of these claims, they depend on 
textualism or originalism being able to resolve pressing constitutional issues.  
But what if, as in Brown, they are indeterminate?  Or they produce a resolution 
that is morally unacceptable? 
A number of prominent scholars have rejected textualism and originalism 
in demonstrating how a Brown opinion might have been drafted.  Professor 
John Hart Ely dismissed as irrelevant the quest “to guess what particular 
instances of inequality our 1868 forebearers had at the forefront of their 
minds.”165  Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is one of the Constitution’s 
open textured provisions written to accommodate changing exigencies.  The 
Equal Protection Clause “is among the Constitution’s clearest examples of a 
 
 160. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
DEMOCRACY 139 (1960). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 163. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001). 
 164. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 561 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 165. John Hart Ely, Concurring in the Judgment (except as to remedy), in BALKIN, supra note 
6, at 135. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
796 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:777 
provision whose exact content was understood not to be frozen in time.”166  
Indeed, Professor Ely suggests that those who framed the Clause would have 
expected their descendants to interpret it “in terms of the principles they set 
forth” not based upon their specific preferences which did not find their way 
into the constitutional text.167  Similarly, Professor Jack Balkin relied on a 
mode of constitutional interpretation that rejects slavish adherence to the 
framers’ particular preferences.  He reasons that “the meaning of the American 
Constitution evolves because the document is redemptive.”168  The 
Constitution challenges each new generation “to live up to the promises and 
ideals contained within it,” even if those who framed it had different 
understandings.169  They follow Judge Louis Pollak who in 1959 wrote that the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated “an essentially dynamic 
development by Congress and [the] Court of the liberties outlined in such 
generalized terms in the Amendment.”170 
Professor Archibald Cox argues that we should distinguish between the 
specific intent of the framers regarding school desegregation and their broader 
purpose.171  The former should not bind; the latter should have its influence.  
Or as Alexander Bickel put it, a “two fold” analysis of congressional purpose 
behind a constitutional amendment is needed.  One inquiry should relate to 
congressional understanding “of the immediate effect of the enactment on 
conditions then present”; the other should address “what if any thought was 
given to the long-range effect, under future circumstances, of provisions 
necessarily intended for permanence.”172  The “proposition that all men are 
born with equal right to human dignity and to equal standing in the eyes of 
government regardless of the circumstances of their birth” not only inheres in 
the Equal Protection Clause but “had been a basic American ideal since before 
the Declaration of Independence.”173  Robert Bork, who essentially followed 
Professor Bickel’s approach, argued that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment thought that equality and segregation were compatible.  
Subsequent history showed that “segregation rarely if ever produced 
equality.”174  “The Court’s realistic choice” was between equality and 
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segregation, a decision which inevitably pointed towards equality.175  Thus, 
according to Judge Bork, Brown was consistent with the original understanding 
to the extent it emphasized equality.176 
B. Bolling v. Sharpe 
Bolling offers other opportunity to explore issues regarding constitutional 
interpretation.  Unlike the other cases that arose in four different states, Bolling 
considered whether segregated schools in the District of Columbia violated the 
Constitution.  The Equal Protection Clause addresses state, not federal, action; 
it could not furnish the constitutional norm in Bolling as it did in Brown.  As 
such, Bolling posed different constitutional questions.  Is there a reverse 
incorporation doctrine such that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
incorporates the Equal Protection Clause?177  Can the Constitution state a 
different constitutional norm for federal and state government? 
The Court concluded that segregation in public schools in the District of 
Columbia was unconstitutional.  It rested its conclusion on two arguments.  
First, “liberty” in the Due Process Clause required that government not restrict 
human conduct “except for a proper governmental objective.”178  School 
segregation was not “reasonably related” to such an objective and accordingly 
was an arbitrary burden on the liberty of black children.179  Moreover, because 
the Constitution bans states from maintaining racially segregated public 
schools, “it would be unthinkable” for the Constitution to “impose a lesser duty 
on the Federal Government.”180 
This resolution might not satisfy all.  A textualist might suggest that the 
Constitution does not prevent the federal government from operating 
segregated schools.  For instance, Judge Bork argues that had Bolling “been 
guided by the Constitution, it would have had to rule that it had no power to 
strike down the District’s Laws.”181  The Equal Protection Clause may have 
been thought necessary vis-a-vis the states because history cautioned that states 
had proclivity to mistreat minorities.  The absence of an Equal Protection 
Clause binding the federal government might mean that the Constitution trusts 
the national political process to handle such issues.  An originalist might reach 
the same conclusion. 
Even if one accepted Judge McConnell’s argument that the framers of the 
Equal Protection Clause intended to outlaw school segregation, it does not help 
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resolve the propriety of school desegregation in the nation’s capital.  Quite 
clearly, those who framed the Fifth Amendment did not intend to ban public 
school segregation.  Yet an originalist cannot comfortably conclude, as did the 
Court, that “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a 
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”182  For quite clearly, those who 
framed the Fifth Amendment did not mean to bar school segregation.  Does the 
Constitution allow the federal government to discriminate?  The Court viewed 
this prospect as “unthinkable.”183  As Michael Klarman observes, “[w]hat 
Frankfurter found compelling was the moral, not the legal, argument against 
segregation in the nation’s capital.”184  Yet this resolution turns on “morality 
and. . . politics,”185 argues Judge Bork.  The Court has left other issues to the 
political process; why not this one, too? 
One might accept the Court’s resolution that views the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause as having a substantive, as well as procedural, mission.  
Liberty might include freedom to attend desegregated schools, and such liberty 
could not be arbitrarily denied.  Yet if the Due Process Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment was capable of outlawing racial segregation in schools, 
presumably the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment would be as 
well.  What then is the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, why was it 
included, and why did the Court rely on it in Brown? 
The equality norm might be traced to the Declaration of Independence, 
which declared the “self-evident truth” that “all men are created equal.”  
Perhaps that ideal was made applicable against the federal government by the 
Ninth Amendment, which made clear that the enumeration of certain 
constitutional rights was not meant to negate the existence of others.186  Yet the 
equality norm which the Declaration announced did not render slavery 
unconstitutional.  And if it was sufficient to preclude the federal government 
from operating segregated schools why was it also not robust enough to 
restrain the states without the need to ratify the Equal Protection Clause? 
Alternatively, one might identify precedent as applying such a requirement 
on the federal government.  Indeed, in Korematsu v. United States,187 ten years 
before Brown, the Court applied an equal protection norm against the federal 
government.  Perhaps Korematsu provided a precedential argument that the 
norm limited Congress.  Indeed, in Bolling the Court did cite Korematsu 
regarding the need to scrutinize racial classifications closely.  It might have 
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cited it for the related point that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment restricted Congress’s ability to discriminate based on race.  Of 
course, Korematsu ultimately found that the military internment of Japanese 
American citizens did not violate the constitutional norm at issue.  It has 
become a much maligned decision.  Should such an important point rest simply 
on the implicit reliance on such a disfavored case? 
Although the Equal Protection Clause only applies to states, the 
Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is not so limited.  Rather, it 
established a national standard of citizenship, making all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States citizens of the United States and their states of 
residence.  The Citizenship Clause might provide a basis for concluding that 
the federal government would not treat some as lesser citizens than others.188  
Yet the same argument would also seem to apply to the states, too.  If so, what 
was the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause?  Moreover, Professor Frank 
Michelman has argued that the Citizenship Clause may have given African-
Americans rights previously enjoyed by whites, but it does not describe what 
rights those were.189  If the Constitution did not previously outlaw racial 
separation, the Citizenship Clause could not convey such a right.190 
IV.  DID BROWN MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
Brown has achieved iconic status in American constitutional law.  It “may 
be the most important political, social, and legal event in America’s twentieth-
century history,”191 wrote J. Harvie Wilkinson, III in 1979.  Professor (now 
Judge) Wilkinson’s statement regarding Brown’s significance can easily be 
multiplied many times over.  The sheer number of celebrations of Brown to 
mark its fiftieth anniversary (not to mention those that marked May 17 on prior 
five-year intervals) testify to the special place it holds.  To many, Brown 
confirmed that an activist Court could overcome political inertia to achieve 
justice and social change.192  But how much difference did Brown really make?  
Was Brown’s success (or failure) due to the nature of the problem it addressed 
or the manner in which it dealt with it?  Or does the verdict on Brown reveal 
strengths (or weaknesses) of the judiciary? 
Some scholars have argued that Brown made little difference in 
transforming race relations during the mid-twentieth century.  “The history of 
the campaign against racial injustice since 1954, when the Supreme Court 
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decided Brown v. Board of Education, is a history in large part of failure,”193 
wrote Ronald Dworkin in 1985. 
Because Brown addressed segregation in public education, the public 
schools are one place to look to measure its impact.  In the 1954-55 school 
year, only .001% of Southern black children went to public schools with 
whites.194  Nine years later, the figure had risen to only 1.2%195  Most of the 
increase occurred in Texas and Tennessee.196  More than 2000 school districts 
still maintained racially segregated schools a decade after Brown.197 
As Professor Gerald Rosenberg has argued, in the South “[f]or ten years, 
1954–64, virtually nothing happened.”198  The picture changed during the next 
decade.  Whereas 1.2% of southern black children attended integrated public 
schools in 1963–64, 91.3% did in 1972–73.199 
What accounts for the difference?  In 1964 Congress passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.200  It empowered the Attorney General to initiate school 
desegregation suits on behalf of individuals, a significant development since 
plaintiffs often suffered severe personal and economic injury.  Title VI 
empowered the federal government to withdraw federal funds from public 
schools that practiced racial discrimination.  The Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965201 appropriated substantial sums of federal assistance to 
low income school districts.  Federal regulations that HEW promulgated to 
supplement Title VI required schools desegregate to preserve their funding.202 
This data suggests several lessons.  First, school desegregation did not 
occur simply because the Court rejected separate but equal.  By 1966–67, less 
than 17% of Southern blacks attended integrated schools.203  Put differently, 
most Southern children who entered school the fall after the Court decided 
Brown experienced segregated education through graduation. 
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Second, change occurred only after the political branches became engaged.  
During the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower did little to support Brown.204  
At his press conference two days after the decision, he declined to give the 
South guidance and simply stated that “[t]he Supreme Court has spoken and I 
am sworn to uphold the constitutional processes in this country; and I will 
obey.”205  Eisenhower’s endorsement of the decision would have lent it the 
imprimatur of his prestige as President and as a national hero.  As Civil Rights 
Leader Roy Wilkins put it, if Eisenhower “‘had fought World War II the way 
he fought for civil rights, we would all be speaking German today.’”206  
Although President John F. Kennedy supported Brown he did not become fully 
engaged until June of 1963.207  In the aftermath of Birmingham, when police 
turned fire hoses and dogs on peaceful black demonstrators, Kennedy gave an 
eloquent televised address supporting integration and introduced Civil Rights 
legislation.208  Congress took no meaningful action to support Brown until 
1964 when it passed the Civil Rights Act.209  In the 1950s, Congress was 
stymied by Southern resistance.  In March of 1956, some 100 Senators and 
Representatives signed the Southern Manifesto attacking Brown as lawless and 
pledging to take action to achieve its reversal and to prevent its 
implementation.210  Brown, Professor Rosenberg argues, suggests the limited 
impact courts can have in transforming society.211 
Finally, after Brown the Court itself retreated.  Its decision the following 
year in Brown II called for the defendant school boards to “make a prompt and 
reasonable start toward full compliance” and called on District Courts to move 
with “all deliberate speed.”212  The adjectives suggested integration need not 
occur immediately.  Many communities responded with resistance.213  As 
Richard Kluger observed, “[t]hroughout the balance of the Fifties, the South 
interpreted ‘all deliberate speed’ to mean ‘any conceivable delay,’ and 
desegregation was far more a figment in the mind of the Supreme Court than a 
 
 204. See, e.g., id. at 75 (“[Eisenhower] steadfastly refused to commit his immense popularity 
or prestige in support of desegregation in general or Brown in particular.”); KLUGER, supra note 
11 at 755. 
 205. The President’s News Conference of May 19, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 489, 491 (May 
19, 1954). 
 206. Quoted in ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 76. 
 207. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 178–82 (2000). 
 208. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 
468 (June 11, 1963). 
 209. See ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 46–47. 
 210. 102 CONG. REC. 4515 (1956). 
 211. ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 70–71. 
 212. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300, 301 (1955). 
 213. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432–33 (1968). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
802 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:777 
prominent new feature on the American social landscape.”214  Although the 
Court in Cooper v. Aaron held that violence and disorder was not a basis to 
defer enforcement of Brown,215 the Court did not decide another school 
desegregation case until 1963.  Only after the political branches became 
involved in the mid-1960s, did the Court aggressively return to the fray.  In 
Green v. County School Board it ordered school boards to immediately offer 
realistic plans to completely remove state imposed segregation “root and 
branch.”216  The following year, the Court directed that “the obligation of 
every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate 
now and hereafter only unitary schools.”217 
Other scholars have joined Professor Rosenberg in challenging the heroic 
account of Brown.  Professor Michael Klarman argues that Brown’s direct 
effects were limited.  Outside of the South, some desegregation began before 
Brown.  In the South, change did not begin for a decade.  After Brown, 
Southern politics polarized, becoming more racial.  Southern school boards 
became intransigent.  Desegregation depended on plaintiffs initiating lawsuits, 
and few were willing or financially able to assume that role with the attendant 
economic and personal risks.  When desegregation occurred, it was due to the 
Civil Rights Movement and the 1964 Act, not to Brown.  Professor Klarman 
suggests that Brown’s most significant effect was an indirect one.  The 
decision radicalized southern politics.  The violent and extremist nature of 
white supremacy came to the surface in response to the decision.  Its exposure 
transformed national opinion on race, making possible the political support for 
the 1964 Act.218 
Some suggest that in Brown a Northern majority imposed its will on a 
Southern minority.219  Does the presence of three Southerners on the Court—
Hugo Black, Tom Clark and Stanley Reed—soften this account?  Moreover, 
Brown included cases in Kansas and Delaware (not to mention the District of 
Columbia), hardly the deep South.  Yet notwithstanding its words,220 the Court 
seemed to conceive of the problem as an issue for the South, where segregation 
was overt, rather than for the rest of the country where it stemmed in part from 
residential patterns. 
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Alternatively, Professor Derrick Bell argues that Brown reflects his 
“interest-convergence” thesis.221  Professor Bell does not see Brown as a 
moment when America came to grips with its racist history.  In essence, he 
argued that the Court protects the interests of African-Americans when their 
interests converge with those of whites,222 particularly elite whites.  In part, 
Professor Bell bases his theory on the argument that in the 1950s school 
segregation had become an embarrassment to America in prosecuting the Cold 
War.223  The Soviet Union was able to exploit America’s racial problems with 
third-world countries.  Professor Mary Dudziak has also argued that the “Cold 
War imperative” contributed to Brown.224  Professor Dudziak notes that 
“promot[ing] democracy among peoples of color around the world was 
seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”225  Indeed, 
NAACP and government briefs in Brown argued that segregation jeopardized 
America’s international interests.226  Surely America’s racial problems did 
provide the Soviets an easy way to score propaganda points in the third world.  
Yet interestingly, this Cold War imperative did not move President 
Eisenhower, who had a primary constitutional responsibility in the Cold War, 
to champion Brown.  If Brown had much significance in the success of the 
Cold War, the paramount issue of the day, why was Eisenhower not a more 
forceful advocate for integration?  Nor did the Court argue in Brown that 
desegregation would help combat communism, an argument that might have 
carried weight in the South. 
Did the Court miss the mark because it misconstrued the problems under 
attack in Brown?  Robert L. Carter has stated that in 1954 he, like others, “saw 
the dual school system as the key barrier to equal educational opportunity for 
African-Americans.”227  Looking back forty years later, he thought his faith 
“naive.”228  Indeed, by 1968, he already had come to conceive the problem 
differently.  “Few in the country, black or white, understood in 1954 that racial 
segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that the real sickness is 
that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of 
white superiority.”229 
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Professor Mark Tushnet has suggested that we should distinguish between 
the short-term and long-term effects of the Court’s decisions.  Brown “was so 
widely disregarded in the deep South” that it was a “long-term irrelevancy” 
(measured over its first decade).230  If the chronological measure is stretched to 
a generation, Brown successfully “eliminat[ed] legally sanctioned explicit 
racial school segregation.”231  The findings of Professors Rosenberg and 
Klarman show that congressional and executive action was needed to integrate 
southern schools. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, Brown represented a constitutional 
principle against discrimination against blacks that was applied in other 
contexts.  It was, in Robert L. Carter’s words, “a revolutionary statement of 
race relations law.”232  During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
for instance, many legislators invoked Brown as the law of the land.  The task 
of proponents of the Act would have been complicated had the Court 
reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson.  Clearly, as Professor Tushnet argues, there was 
value in “the public assertion by the nation’s highest court of a principle, 
arguably with large-scale though long-term effects on public opinion about 
race.”233  It signaled to the nation “that one of its major institutions took the 
claims of African-Americans to equal treatment seriously.”234  As Professor 
Bickel put it, “announcement of the principle was in itself an action of great 
moment, considering the source from which it came.”235  Brown no doubt 
played an important part in winning acceptance by whites of the principles for 
which it stood.  As the ruling of a unanimous Supreme Court, it represented the 
first time a branch of our federal government embraced the general principles 
that states must treat blacks equally.236  Brown, as Richard Kluger put it, 
“represented nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals.”237 
Finally, outside the South, Brown did have some positive short-term 
effects on schools.  The decision triggered much school desegregation in 
border states and in the North.238 
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V.  BROWN AND THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Brown made the Equal Protection Clause an instrument to protect 
minorities.  As late as 1927 Justice Holmes had derided the Clause as the 
“usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”239 
Although the Court occasionally invoked the Clause240 prior to Brown it 
“was not a strong element in the Supreme Court’s arsenal.”241  Brown changed 
that.  In a series of cases, after Brown, the Court used the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down segregation in public auditoriums,242 beaches,243 golf 
courses,244 sporting events,245 public restaurants,246 buses,247 jails,248 and 
courtrooms.249  So, too, the Court ultimately used the Clause to strike down 
antimiscegenation statutes.250 
The reinvigoration of the Equal Protection Clause was not limited to racial 
discrimination.  Brown served as a model for other groups to claim protected 
status.  Women,251 aliens,252 the mentally retarded,253 children born out of 
wedlock,254 and gays and lesbians255 used Brown as a paradigm in claiming 
protected status under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Brown also inaugurated a proliferation of “rights consciousness” among 
Americans.256  Constitutional rights were not asserted simply by various 
groups claiming protected status under the Equal Protection Clause.  Others 
made novel claims regarding rights they viewed as fundamental.  “Brown was 
the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down numerous laws of many 
states in order to protect individual civil, as distinguished from economic, 
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rights,”257 wrote Professor William E. Nelson.  Due to Brown, Professor 
Nelson wrote, “Americans of all groups . . . have grown to understand that they 
have rights and that those rights can be enforced through law.”258  As such, 
Brown became the model that other disadvantaged groups used to assert their 
own rights.  Women, gays, even whites used Brown to justify their own claims 
for better constitutional treatment. 
The proliferation of constitutional rights relates to another change 
identified with Brown—the enhanced role of the Supreme Court.  Brown put 
the Court in the midst of the nation’s most pressing domestic problems.  
Whereas the post New Deal Court had essentially given Congress a wide berth 
regarding economic legislation, Brown marked the beginning of the Court’s 
embrace of the logic of Justice Stone’s famous Carolene Products footnote 
four.  Yet the Court did not limit itself to protecting discrete and insular 
minorities and keeping the democratic processes open as Justice Stone’s 
footnote prescribed.  It also assumed a broader, more ambitious role in 
articulating and defining constitutional norms in areas like criminal justice and 
privacy. 
The Court’s work impacted the shape and operation of American 
government at the national and local level.  The new constitutional norms that 
the post-Brown Court articulated constrained federal and state political 
institutions.  Legislative and executive bodies needed to conform their conduct 
to accommodate the Court’s constitutional interpretations.  Moreover, the 
Court’s intervention resulted in part from Congress’s failure to act.  Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to address school 
segregation.  As Justice Jackson put it during oral argument, “‘I suppose that 
realistically the reason this case is here is that action couldn’t be obtained from 
Congress.’”259 
In a recent article, Professor Nelson also claims that Brown changed the 
way in which Americans think about law.  In essence, prior to Brown “legal 
thinkers tended to see law as a caboose and the judge as someone who tidied 
up and ensured that law was following in the direction society was leading.”260  
After Brown “we now tend to look upon law more as the engine that will 
dictate the course society will take.”261  The old approach was “progressive, 
although never radical.”262  The new orientation could accommodate radical 
but also reactionary dispositions.263 
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VI.  WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 
Much of the controversy regarding Brown relates to what it said or failed 
to say rather than to the result it reached.  Put differently, most cannot imagine 
living in a society in which Brown was not law.  But many would have written 
the opinion differently than the Court did.  As such, the case provides an 
opportunity for students to consider how the opinion should have been crafted.  
Of course, this consideration turns on legal principles as well as political 
realities.  The Court needed to anticipate the likely response to its decision and 
opinion and calculate how to achieve a favorable outcome.  Here, of course, 
hindsight confers on modern would-be jurists a perspective and advantage 
Chief Justice Warren lacked. 
Some praised Chief Justice Warren’s opinion.  Professor Edmond Cahn 
thought his style “most commendably bland.”264  Warren was very wise to 
avoid the “temptation—to indulge in democratic rhetoric” and to subordinate 
“getting into the anthologies [to] presenting the country with a model of 
rational calm.”265  Others suggest the Court should have elevated its rhetoric.  
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III observes that “the Court refused to lift the nation to 
the magnificence of the principle it . . . redeemed. . . . In short, the opinion 
failed to rouse or inspire; it simply existed.”266 
The Court, in Brown, sought to “persuad[e] the persuadable southerner.”267  
To pursue this objective, Chief Justice Warren wrote a short opinion in which 
he consciously pulled his punches to avoid accusatory rhetoric that might 
inflame the South.  Yet in this respect, Professor Powe argues Brown was “a 
failure.”268  The opinion could only persuade those capable of persuasion if it 
argued that desegregation would help, not harm, them.  Professor Powe 
suggests that by relying on psychology the Court sacrificed its claim to 
expertise; after all, the justices were presumably constitutional, not 
psychological, wizards.269  Moreover, he suggests that the Court missed a 
persuasive argument regarding the general intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.270  Its framers favored equality but also assumed that segregation 
was consistent with it.  Yet American history had proved that separate but 
equal was an oxymoron regarding race.  The overriding purpose of the clause 
should dominate the specific, but inconsistent, preferences of some framers.271 
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Professor (now Judge) Louis Pollak provided an alternative draft of the 
Court’s opinion on its fifth anniversary.  Professor Pollak recognized that 
Plessy applied to schools but thought the Court was obligated to reexamine 
“grave constitutional questions in a proper case” especially “when the 
constitutional provisions at issue are themselves of an evolutionary 
generality.”272  The Court need not engage psychological offerings because 
legislation “curtail[ing] the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect.”273  Jim Crow laws degraded blacks and that was their function.  
“Such governmental denigration is a form of injury the Constitution recognizes 
and will protect against.”274 
Professor Jack Balkin recently invited eight leading constitutional law 
scholars to join him on a mock court to rewrite Brown.  Whereas Chief Justice 
Earl Warren’s eight colleagues silently joined his opinion, Professor Balkin’s 
opinion was joined only by his two colleagues at Yale Law School, Professor 
Bruce Ackerman and Professor Drew Days, III.  Five others concurred in the 
judgment but for different reasons. 
Should Brown, for instance, have overruled Plessy v. Ferguson rather than 
simply concluding that separate but equal had no place in public education?  
Whereas Professor Days argues that Plessy should have been overruled 
outright,275 Professor Cass Sunstein’s adherence to judicial minimalism leads 
him to follow Chief Justice Warren’s course in limiting his rejection of the 
doctrine to public education.276  Professor Derrick Bell, however, argued that 
overruling Plessy would be a charade. Whites would continue to resist equality 
for blacks.  Better to preserve Plessy but press for truly equal schools.277 
Chief Justice Warren tried to avoid condemning the South in his opinion.  
Rather than documenting the inhumane mistreatment of African-Americans, he 
argued simply that segregated education based on race “generates a feeling of 
inferiority” in black children which compromised their ability to learn.278  The 
Court, in its famous footnote eleven, relied on Dr. Kenneth C. Clark’s doll 
study and Gunner Myrdal’s book, The American Dilemma.  Yet Dr. Clark’s 
work was controversial—although Southern black children preferred a white to 
a black doll, so, too, did black children in the North where de jure school 
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segregation was not prevalent.  Should the Court have relied on social science 
showing psychological harm?  Many believe that the reliance on psychological 
studies was a mistake.279  The doll study used a small sample and the data did 
not uniformly point to segregation as the source of psychological harm.  
Moreover, if equal protection turns on psychological proof, segregation could 
be reinstituted if such proof were absent.280  Further, Southerners were able to 
turn Brown’s wording around and claim that they were victims suffering 
psychological harm from the Court’s interference with their traditional way of 
life.281  Justice Clarence Thomas viewed the psychological study as irrelevant.  
He wrote: 
  Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused 
psychological feelings of inferiority.  Public school systems that separated 
blacks and provided them with superior educational resources—making blacks 
“feel” superior to whites sent to lesser schools—would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, whether or not the white students felt stigmatized, just as do 
school systems in which the positions of the races are reversed.  Psychological 
injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question whether state actors have engaged 
in intentional discrimination—the critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  The judiciary is fully competent to make 
independent determinations concerning the existence of state action without 
the unnecessary and misleading assistance of the social sciences.282 
Alternatively, should Brown have emphasized legal principles?  Professor 
Days, for instance, draws from Hirabayashi v. United States283 the principle 
that racial or ancestral distinctions between citizens “‘are by their very nature 
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality.’”284  Judge Pollak invoked a similar principle in his 1959 article, 
condemning governmental action abridging the civil rights of one racial 
group.285  Discussion earlier suggests some alternative lines which the Court 
might have pursued. 
VII.  SUPREME COURT POLITICS 
Brown provides a fascinating window into the decision-making process of 
the Court, an institution whose deliberations generally remain inscrutable to all 
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but Court insiders.  Several excellent accounts shed light on how the Court 
reached its unanimous result.286  The episode provides a case study in judicial 
leadership as exemplified by Chief Justice Warren.  It also illustrates the way 
in which justices must accommodate their colleagues’ dispositions to serve 
institutional goals. 
The Court was, of course, split when it first heard the cases in 1952.  Some 
estimate that four or perhaps five justices would have voted to sustain Plessy.  
Klarman concludes that four justices—Black, Douglas, Burton and Minton—
were prepared to vote that segregation was unconstitutional in 1952, that 
Vinson and Reed were disposed to affirm Plessy, and the others were 
uncertain.287  His analysis is generally consistent with Justice Douglas’ 
memorandum of May 17, 1954.288  Justice Frankfurter thought a vote in 
December 1952 would have invalidated segregation, 5-4 (with Frankfurter 
joining the majority) but in several opinions.289 
Chief Justice Fred Vinson had little influence with his colleagues; Bernard 
Schwartz has written that when Brown came to the Court, “the Brethren were 
openly to display their contempt for their Chief.”290  As a stalling tactic, Justice 
Felix Frankfurter persuaded his colleagues to direct the parties to file 
additional briefs, on the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and regarding remedial matters.  Yet more argument would not necessarily 
resolve the split on the Court.  And some, like Justice Frankfurter, thought a 
unanimous decision necessary to mitigate Southern resistance.  On September 
8, 1953, fate intervened.  Vinson died.  Justice Frankfurter told an associate, 
“‘This is the first indication I have ever had that there is a God.’”291 
Eisenhower’s appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren offered an 
opportunity for the Court to resolve Brown.  Eisenhower certainly did not have 
this result in mind.  He did not apply a litmus test for appointment to the Court.  
Indeed, he did nothing to advance the plaintiffs’ case.  While Brown was 
before the Court, Eisenhower invited Warren to a White House dinner and 
seated him next to John W. Davis, the attorney for South Carolina.  
Eisenhower praised Davis effusively and told Warren: “‘These [Southerners] 
are not bad people.  All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little 
girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big black bucks.’”292 
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Warren brought at least three resources to his job which helped move 
Brown to a unanimous decision.  First, he lacked the baggage that 
compromised his predecessor’s ability to lead the Court.293  On the contrary, 
many on the Court were predisposed toward Warren.294  In the early days of 
his tenure, all of his colleagues sought to win his favor.  Second, he had 
enormous leadership skills.  Finally, Chief Justice Warren was to become a 
strong advocate of the position the Court adopted in Brown. 
Chief Justice Warren’s statement at the December 12, 1953 conference 
struck two notes that resonated with the Brethren and set the tone for the 
course followed.  First, he cast Brown as a moral issue that “went straight to 
the ultimate human values involved.”295  Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine, 
said Warren, rested “upon the basic premise that the Negro race is inferior,”296 
a notion Warren rejected.  As such, Warren moved the discussion from 
conventional legal arguments, where plaintiffs’ case was more challenging, to 
a moral plane where it was compelling.  Second, Chief Justice Warren 
indicated a sensitivity to Southern sensibilities.  He recognized that “the time 
element” was important, that Court action should be done “in a tolerant way,” 
a sentiment he repeated.297 
Chief Justice Warren’s statement eliminated any doubt regarding the 
outcome.  His made five clear votes to overturn segregation.  Others on the 
Court felt pressure to make the decision unanimous to help avert resistance.  
Moreover, Professor Klarman suggests that Warren’s stance reduced the 
bargaining power of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson and may have induced 
them to subordinate their legal doubts to their political and moral 
preferences.298  By the end of the conference, Professor Schwartz concludes 
plaintiffs had at least six votes (Warren, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton 
and Minton) and two others (Jackson and Clark) were within reach depending 
on the opinion written.299  Warren regularly spoke with his colleagues and 
frequently lunched with the lone holdout, Justice Stanley Reed, and those most 
likely to influence him.  Although Reed initially planned to dissent, Warren 
apparently persuaded him over time that a dissent would not be “the best thing 
for the [C]ountry.”300  The Court anticipated a hostile response from some 
circles and thought a unanimous result would mitigate that reaction.  “It was 
necessary, therefore, if ever it had been, to exert to the utmost the prestige, the 
oracular authority of the institution,” wrote Alexander Bickel, law clerk to 
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Justice Frankfurter during the 1953–54 term.301  “To this end, it was desirable 
that the Court speak unanimously, with one voice from the deep.”302 
The opinion reflected some of these strategic decisions.  Warren assigned 
the opinion to himself, a choice which signified the importance of the case and 
allowed him to control its content.  The opinion was unusually short and 
written in an accessible style.  It avoided condemnatory language, focused 
narrowly on education, and provided little in the way of rationale.  These 
features probably helped secure the unanimous result behind a single opinion.  
Although Justice Jackson considered writing a concurrence, a March 30, 1954, 
heart attack hospitalized him. 
VIII.  THE REMEDY 
In virtually all cases, the Supreme Court announces a remedy in the same 
opinion that addresses the merits.  Brown was different.  The Court deferred a 
decree.  The “variety of local conditions” made formulating decrees “problems 
of considerable complexity.”303  The Court instead asked the parties to present 
yet more argument on Questions 4 and 5304 from its order of June 8, 1953.305  
Moreover, the Court invited the Attorney General to participate and allowed 
Amicus briefs by attorneys general from states allowing or requiring 
segregated schools.306  The Court’s ultimate decree did not issue for more than 
a year, a delay due in part to the death of Justice Jackson and appointment of 
Judge John Harlan to succeed him. 
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Just as Brown was a major victory for the plaintiffs, Brown II was a 
disappointment.  The Court had agreed on two values—school segregation was 
unjustifiable but it must be implemented with tolerance for Southern 
sensibilities.  Brown I had vindicated the first principle to avoid harming black 
children.  Now Brown II demonstrated the Court’s sensitivity to the South. 
Brown II turned on three basic components.  First, the Court recognized 
that “a variety of local problems” made school desegregation impervious to a 
single national remedy.  The cases were accordingly remanded to local federal 
and state judges to implement desegregation. 
Second, the courts were to be “guided by equitable principles.”307  The 
hallmark of equity was “practical flexibility” and balancing “public and private 
needs.”308  As such, the lower courts had a good deal of discretion and could 
consider, among other things, local “obstacles” to integration.  Finally, 
desegregation need not occur at once.  Rather, defendants were to “make a 
prompt and reasonable start” and it was to proceed with “all deliberate 
speed.”309 
Predictably, the Southern states had argued for delay.  At oral argument 
they argued that school desegregation would lead to interracial marriage, 
sexual promiscuity and the spread of venereal disease from the black to the 
white population.  They argued black children were intellectually inferior.  One 
attorney suggested to Chief Justice Warren that the South would not comply 
with a Court decree.  Citing their shattered state of mind, they proposed a 
veritable obstacle course of hearings at which those seeking desegregation 
would bear the burden of proof.  The NAACP proposed that the process begin 
in fall 1955 and be completed a year later.  The Government proposed an 
intermediate position.  Citing the Court’s reliance on psychological harm to 
black children, the Government argued that “[i]n similar fashion, psychological 
and emotional factors are involved.”310 
The remedy took the pressure off the South.  Gradualism, not immediacy 
was the Court’s timetable for desegregation.  “All deliberate speed” was an 
oxymoron that signaled to the South that it could take its time.  It did. 
How might one account for the timidity of Brown II after the boldness of 
Brown I?  To some extent the two were a package.  The justices agreed to rule 
for the plaintiffs regarding the constitutional norm with the understanding that 
the remedy would be more modest.  In some respects, the result reflected a 
familiar legal strategy—balance a victory on liability with a reduced remedy.  
The justices thought unanimity was important, yet part of its cost was a 
tolerant remedy. 
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The Court might also have been wary of issuing an order it could not 
enforce.  The justices, like the lawyers, had studied the familiar account of 
Marbury in which Chief Justice Marshall avoided issuing an order to Secretary 
of State James Madison that he could not enforce.  The Justice Department 
recommended a gradual approach, and President Eisenhower showed no 
disposition to crusade for school desegregation. 
Brown I had met some Southern resistance.  The justices no doubt feared 
violence would greet immediate desegregation.  They may also have thought 
they could appease moderate Southerners with a more measured approach.311 
Could the Court have followed a different course?  Southern resistance was 
probably inevitable.  Justice Black had favored limiting the decree to the 
named plaintiffs only, not classes of students.  Yet he predicted that 
Southerners would “fight” and that there would “be a deliberate effort to 
circumvent the decree.”312  Although Professor Klarman regards Brown as 
“misguided,” he argues that the justices should not be accused of calculating 
foolishly.313  “They operated without the aid of historical hindsight, and their 
prediction that conciliation on their part would strengthen [S]outhern 
moderates and encourage compliance was plausible.”314 
Similarly, Judge Wilkinson argues that “[i]t was not hesitancy on the part 
of the Supreme Court that amplified the volume of [S]outhern protest in the 
years after Brown.  The impulse of obstruction was too indigenous, too deeply 
embedded politically, historically, socially, psychologically, economically, 
sexually, and in every other way.”315  “Deliberate speed,” Wilkinson argued, 
“tried to balance [in reasonable fashion] “the historical realities, to redeem the 
injustices of history without reopening its wounds.”316 
The Court did not show continuing leadership regarding school 
desegregation in the years immediately following Brown.  By the same token, 
it had little power to order the South, and the President showed little 
disposition to help.  A decade after Brown almost nothing had changed 
regarding desegregation of Southern schools.  Black children entered 
segregated Southern public schools in 1955 and were still attending segregated 
schools a decade later.  During this time, the Court largely absented itself from 
school desegregation cases.  The Court assumed a more active role in the late 
1960s.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent legislation provided the 
Executive Branch with tools to persuade many districts to integrate.  The Court 
ordered the time for deliberation finished and approved more aggressive 
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instruments, like busing, to achieve integration.  Substantial progress was made 
until the courts and political leadership retreated during the latter part of the 
Twentieth Century.  The story of those cases, and their impact, provides a 
related, but separate, topic for constitutional law. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay has suggested some of the angles that might prove fruitful in 
teaching Brown.  Many streams, some suggested in passing, run through 
Brown.  Brown is our principal case about race and education but is also a 
springboard to other civil rights decisions in favor of blacks and other 
minorities.  It was a reference point for the school desegregation cases of the 
1960s and the following decades and of the affirmative action cases during the 
last quarter century.  It was the paradigm for claims of rights by other 
disadvantaged groups.  It provides a window into federalism and separation of 
powers issues and shows the possibilities, and limitations, of the judiciary to 
effect change.  It provides a vehicle to test attitudes toward constitutional 
interpretation.  Ultimately, it is a case about our aspirations for America and 
the distance between our ideals and reality. 
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